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Abstract  
While few would doubt that censorship is a form of surveillance, the practice and theory of 
censorship does not hold as prominent a place within surveillance studies as one might think. In this 
paper, we demonstrate the constitutive effects of censorship which seep into the collective mentality 
and in Foucauldian terms, “conducts the conduct”. We examine the wider socio-political impact of 
China’s censorship of COVID-19. We argue that censorship is a force “at large”. By this we refer to 
the pervasive uptake of censorship practices at different levels and how it manifests itself as a form 
of power unchained, making it difficult, if not impossible to track and contain its impact, even for 
the authorities. We argue that censorship surveils the expressed and by extension, regulates the not-
yet-expressed. It surveils what can be perceived, and by extension, pre-conditions the not-yet-
conceived. We highlight the domestic impact of how China’s censorship regime bends its 
population into acquiescing to a harmonious denial of their collective prospects and how it curtails 
the global response.  
Keywords 
censorship theory; COVID-19; China; surveillance 
Introduction  
COVID-19, a zoonotic virus which likely spread to humans through an intermediate animal 
reservoir, emerged in southern China in late 2019 and was declared a pandemic by the World Health 
Organisation in March 2020. One of the ironies of COVID-19 is that despite criticisms of 
surveillance mechanisms, they seem to have demonstrated their effectiveness in containing the 
virus. This is especially the case in China’s response to the pandemic (French and Monahan 2020). 
The Chinese government was able to control COVID-19 through strict quarantine measures in 
Hubei province and the deployment of the party-state’s massive “surveillant assemblage” (Haggerty 
and Ericson 2000). Measures included the use of drones, GPS tracking, artificial intelligence, facial 
recognition systems, software that analyses personal data to sort individuals into color-coded 
categories of risk, QR scans to limit access to public buildings, and mobile phone apps that can alert 
users if they have been on a flight or a train with a known COVID-19 carrier or are nearing a 
building where infected patients live (Kuo 2020a; Yang and Zhu 2020; Dukakis 2020).  
China presents a cautious tale even when one focuses only on its more traditional ways of 
monitoring and controlling its population: censorship. These include deleting reports that exposed 
officials’ early efforts to hide the severity of the outbreak and arresting those who tried to thwart the 
authorities’ will by preserving reports about the outbreak or speaking out on social media – the best 
known case being that of Dr Wenliang Li who first publicised a SARS like virus amongst his 
former medical school students in late December 2019, only to be detained by police and forced to 
sign a statement that he had spread false rumours and ‘disturbed the social order’ (Wang et al 2020; 
Zhao 2020). For those familiar with surveillance in China, the attempted cover was not a surprise. 
Censorship in the name of preserving a “harmonious society” has been an overriding socio-political 
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priority in China (China Daily 2010). In the advent of Western and Chinese new year celebrations 
and with municipal and provincial congresses underway, it seemed only logical, given the 
prevailing political rationality, that local health authorities controlled what people were allowed to 
say and see rather than control the virus. 
Yet the impact of the party-state’s surveillance would be hugely understated, if not misunderstood, 
if it is framed only as a tug of war between state and society with consequences contained within 
one country’s borders. Once censorship has been normalised in a society it is no longer just a facet 
of the political culture but also seeps into the collective mentality that, in Foucauldian terms, 
“conducts the conduct”, and in the process censors the imagination (Foucault 2007). More 
specifically, as we argue in this paper, the first wave of COVID-19 in China has exposed how 
censorship regimes bend their populations into acquiescing to a harmonious denial of their 
collective prospects, discipling and shaping their very thought processes. We draw attention to this 
spillover effect on curtailing preparedness, not just within China but globally. 
Our study contributes to the understanding of surveillance in two significant ways. Firstly, we 
underline an often assumed but underexplored link between the censorship of words and the 
repression of action. Very few would doubt that censorship is a form of surveillance. Yet the 
practice and theory of censorship does not hold as prominent a place within surveillance studies as 
one might think. It is hardly even mentioned in the leading textbooks and readers in surveillance 
studies (see, for example Monahan and Murakami Wood 2018; Ball et al 2014; Lyon 2007; Hier 
2007; Staples 2000; Dandecker 1994). A search for ‘censorship’ through the archives of 
Surveillance & Society brings up 54 hits but very few of these explicitly address the topic (for 
exceptions, see Akbari and Gabdulhakov 2019; Fang 2017; Lokot 2018; Hou 2017; Vuori and 
Paltemaa 2015). Perhaps, as Fang (2017) suggests in relation to cinema censorship, it is because 
much of the work in the field is published in either area studies or communication and media 
studies instead. Yet censorship is undeniably a constant monitoring of communication processes, a 
mode of ordering responsive to problems of government (Murakami Wood 2013). As we claim here 
it is also far more damaging than realised for what it prohibits in thought and not only in word. 
Restrictions on social imagination and the limits of possibility inevitably foreclose collective 
prospects. 
Secondly, our findings extend understandings of censorship theory as a form of surveillance. Our 
main focus is on how censorship is multi-centred and functions as a constitutive force of our 
cultural and social norms. But we further problematise the practice of censorship in the context of 
emerging risks, which is often not a removal of text, but a subjective calculation between socio-
political repercussions and acceptable truths. A true understanding of the constitutive effects of 
censorship requires an examination of censorship beyond ‘the literal’ (e.g. the text that has been 
“blacked/filtered-out”). We need to incorporate wider social and ethnographic observations in 
identifying, tracing, and interpreting actions (or absence of actions) in context. As a “critical event” 
that shatters local routines and forces people to reify the socio-political ordering of practices (Das 
1997), COVID-19 provides a unique if unfortunate opportunity to study how iterative political 
censorship has been internalised as a blacked-out space in the subjective formation of social actors. 
In what follows we present new censorship theory before investigating how COVID-19 provides a 
valuable case on how censorship and surveillance studies can better capture the latent effects of 
political repression in a global era.  
Censorship as a Form of Surveillance  
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While censorship is not represented as much as one would expect in surveillance literature, the 
opposite is also true. Yet the two have much in common. Conventional accounts of censorship 
largely define it in terms of state actions – institutionalized, interventionist and regulatory (Müller 
2004; Darnton 2014). According to this view, censors are authoritative social actors, extrinsic to the 
communicative process, who seek to coercively delimit the spread of information in the public 
sphere through either prior restraint or post publication repression. The motivations of censors are 
varied but usually involve some combination of ideological commitment, self-preservation, or a 
utilitarian calculus of harm prevention. Beyond a state centric account, censorship studies have 
recently increasingly expanded their focus to the ways in which censorship permeates culture and 
shapes social norms (Burt 1994; Post 1998). These more recent studies draw on Marxist critiques of 
civil society as a sphere of market relationships which make free speech impossible (Bunn 2015). 
Censorship, understood in Althusserian terms, is constitutive of society in that state authorities and 
the ruling class rely not only on repression but on eliciting the consent and support of subaltern 
classes, naturalizing historically contingent social relations – a circulatory relationship between 
subjectivity and exterior structures which Althusser (1971) referred to as interpellation.  
Recent work in censorship has been dubbed “new” censorship theory yet many of its insights will 
be familiar to those working in surveillance studies (Bunn 2015). Censorship understood this way is 
ubiquitous, internalized and generative (Bunn 2015; Müller 2004). Thus, the absence of overt 
censorship does not equate to the presence of free speech; rather it signifies the success of structural 
and impersonal forms of control. Rejecting the binary opposition between the censor and the 
censored helps to recognise the generative aspects of censorship (Freshwater 2004). The term 
“generative” asserts that the full impact of censorship lies not only in what it negates, but also in 
what this negation actively produces, desirable or not (Post 1998). This line of argument draws 
heavily from the work of Bourdieu and Foucault. Bourdieu asserts that the more effective the 
process of regulation and repression is, the less apparent it becomes. The need for top down 
interdiction diminishes as the mechanisms of internalization take hold. He writes, “Censorship is 
never quite as perfect or as invisible as when each agent has nothing to say apart from what he is 
objectively authorised to say [...] he is [...] censored once and for all, through the forms of 
perception and expression that he has internalised and which impose their form on all his 
expressions” (Bourdieu 1991: 138). Foucault illustrates how efforts to foreclose possibility also 
generate new forms of thought and speech. In the first volume of The History of Sexuality he argues 
that Victorian censoriousness about sexuality actually served as a productive “incitement to 
discourse” (Foucault 1976: 17). Censorship theory generalizes this finding, adopting the power/
knowledge thesis, to see other forms of repression as incitements to speech.  
Foucault’s work also helps us to understand self-censorship and self-monitoring when the agent and 
subject of surveillance are one and the same. Andrejevic (2006) invokes the model of a 
“participatory Panopticon”: a form of consensual submission to surveillance when the watched are 
also doing the watching. Self-monitoring can be undertaken through an endless variety of means – 
diaries, therapy, technological instruments – and for myriad reasons such health and fitness, a desire 
to break or build new habits, personal security. Self-censorship does not monitor one’s body or 
emotions or property; rather an agent works on their own words and thoughts.  
Many accounts contest the idea that self-censorship is coercively imposed on journalists as a direct 
result of explicit political pressure, interference or fear (Schimpfössl and Yablokov 2020; 
Schimpfössl et al 2020; Zeveleva 2020; Sherry 2018). Tong’s (2009) work on China shows how 
self-censorship may even help promote media freedom by helping journalists bypass political 
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minefields. One way they do so and yet still get information across is to smuggle topical material 
into media products which, outwardly, appear inconspicuous in character and content. Similarly, 
Repnikova’s (2017) exploration of crisis events in China shows that the boundaries of acceptable 
reporting in authoritarian systems are diffuse and constantly changing. She uses the concept of 
“fluid collaboration” to show how while the state may dominate state-media relations, critical 
journalists proactively and reactively take advantage of openings presented to them in a dual 
process that sees them individually bring attention to social justice issues, yet also contribute to 
consensus building.  
It is no coincidence that that when someone has been censored in China, the common refrain is to 
say that they have been “harmonised” – referring to the notion of “harmonious society”. This idea 
represents China’s vision of socioeconomic justice and prosperity but has become a euphemism for 
stability at all costs (Barr 2011). Chinese government’s efforts to “rejuvenate” the nation to a great 
power status relies on the need for a harmonious society – that is, a society that does not seek to 
destablise the social order or mobilse against authority. Thus, studies on Chinese publics tend to 
highlight issues such as: the utilization of subversive expressions, code words and alternative 
vocabularies to criticize those in power, including blending official and nonofficial voices into 
polyphonic discourses which camouflage criticism (Zidani 2018; Gleiss 2015; Yang 2016; Yang 
2009); and, the use of satire to mimic a specific practice of the state, allowing netizens to 
exaggerate the internal contradictions of the policies or practices concerned without creating an 
easily identifiable symbol of resistance in the process (Lee 2016). Despite the connections between 
surveillance and censorship, the only work that we can find which really melds together the two 
fields are those published in this journal. As mentioned above these include Hou’s (2017) findings 
into how local governments have incorporated the surveillance of public online opinion into their 
daily work, implying a neoliberal form of governance aimed at monitoring and guiding public 
sentiment; Vuori and Paltemaa’s (2015) work on freedom and security as techniques of government 
and governmentality in Chinese internet control (see also Paltemaa et al 2020). While this literature 
has significantly expanded our understanding of censorship practices in China, it tends to focus – as 
the vast majority of censorship studies do – on either the literal act of censoring or on the 
“background practices” which shape and embody how users interact with mediated text (Dreyfus 
2017). There is an epistemic limit of focusing on what has been censored at the point of expression 
or even on the configurations of power underlying censorship regimes. 
Surveillance does not function for itself alone; it supports the need for further forms of surveillance. 
This recursivity is important in censorship as well since it works to support other modes of ordering 
(Murakami Wood 2013). One understudied area is how censorship spawns propaganda. In China 
these concepts merge together as the party-state plays the dual role of censor and creator of public 
opinion – what Cremmers (2017) has referred to as “public opinion management” (yulun guanli). 
This is a crucial and understudied aspect of censorship. While the act of censoring normally creates 
a void, in the Chinese context, this is quickly filled with nationalistic content. Here we agree with 
the insights of Paltemaa and colleagues (2020) who seek to distinguish between negative and 
positive censorship – the former tells people what not to say or think, while the latter instructs them 
what to say or think instead.  There is perhaps no better example of this in China than the new 
internet censorship rules published in late 2019 (State Internet Information Office 2019). These list 
not only negative and illegal content to be censored but also encourages Chinese netizens to post 
positive content. The regulations consolidate and extend previous provisions by encouraging 
content producers to promote ideological content such as the Xi Jinping thought and socialist theory 
in a “complete, correct, and vivid” manner (Chapter 1 Article 5). Content should also aim to support 
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Party action, increase international influence, and promote unity and stability. This is good example 
of how patriotic sentiments are actively constructed in a network of government authorities, 
commercial interests and private users, all of whom benefit in one way or another from engaging in 
nationalism, but without any single actor directly designing the narratives (Schneider 2018). While 
Paltemaa and colleagues (2020) write that we should see censorship and propaganda as two sides of 
the same coin, we argue that this metaphor does not fully capture the generative effects of 
censorship. In our view, censorship resembles a Möbius strip – a one-sided surface with no 
boundaries. Seen in this way, censorship and propaganda constitute an infinite loop. 
Both surveillance and censorship require visibility and legibility. Something or someone must be 
seen in order to be “sorted” (Lyon 2018). Yet censorship can also thwart surveillance for the same 
reasons that it can enable it: detection must precede neutralisation. When writers self-censor they 
seek to protect themselves or others from further surveillance by the state; in this way we can see 
how self-censorship constrains surveillance. Or, as China moved to cover up its number of COVID 
cases, for example, this meant there was less opportunity for technology to be deployed in 
categorizing persons according to risk. A person needed to officially have the virus in order to be 
subject to the more extreme forms of monitoring. Seen in this way, there was a tension between 
censorship and surveillance in China’s attempts to control the pandemic.  
Discretions within the enforcement of censorship remain under-explored. That is, censorship is not 
merely about blacking-out pre-determined text, but also about blocking-out certain avenues of 
(emerging) thought, which is much wider in scope but more difficult to pin down. As we 
demonstrate in this paper, even within an authoritarian regime, censorship is not a uniform practice. 
There was not a nationally agreed formula for distorting the number of COVID infections or deaths. 
Nor was there a sector wide edict that coordinated risk reporting among media outlets. Instead, as 
the next section demonstrates, censorship was far from being an organized  practice. It was a 
discretionary and subjective tailoring of the facts based on an actor’s evaluation of their own socio-
political position. This calls for an approach that moves us beyond an understanding of censorship 
as simply a technical practice of interest only for what it does, or fails to do, to a given text (Sherry 
2018). Instead, we need to foreground the personal and the individual. As Freshwater (2004) rightly 
argued, censorship should be responsive to the experience of those who are subject to it. Personal 
accounts are invaluable for illuminating invisible manifestations, the voids that surround acts of 
silencing and control (Levina 2017).  
 Censorship At Large 
Censorship comes in many forms and is probably best understood as being on a continuum from 
overt state repression to the more insidious forms which work through individual agency and 
subjectivity. This is especially pertinent in order to grasp the full impact of censorship in an 
authoritarian country such as China, where disciplining public opinion into harmony with the party-
line has been woven into the fabric of everyday life. Lyon (2018) argues that surveillance is no 
longer external but is internalized in new ways that impinges on our daily lives through 
innumerable mundane activities. It is thus something that citizens comply with, willingly and 
wittingly or not. This certainly rings true when considering the unconscious societal acquiescence 
to Chinese censorship which helps illustrate how subjects can be complicit in their own domination. 
What has been overlooked, however, is that it is also very easy lose sight of the scale and extent of 
the censorship, both for the information controller and for the audience. We call this censorship “at 
large”. By “at large”, we do not simply mean that censorship is ubiquitous; rather we highlight the 
unknowable and uncontrollable nature of how self-censorship is discretionarily applied at different 
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levels. In other words, we refer both to the pervasive uptake (and intake) of censorship practices at 
different levels and different facets of society, and to it being a form of ‘power unchained’, making 
it difficult, if not impossible to track and contain its impact, even for the authorities. The Chinese 
public has consensually submitted to surveillance in the name of pursing a “harmonious society”. 
This “participatory Panopticon” is what makes censorship at large (Andrejevic 2006). This is 
perhaps best illustrated through a personal example.  
In December 2019 the authors flew to Beijing to conduct fieldwork on a separate project relating to 
science policy. On our fifth day there, we developed symptoms of catarrh followed by a fever. Such 
respiratory problems are not uncommon for travelers adapting to Beijing’s dry winter and air 
pollution. At the time a number of our friends working in the health care system had already heard 
rumours about a mysterious pneumonia in Wuhan. They bantered about how “trendy” it was that 
our illness was part of the latest health mystery. It is unimaginable now for anyone to joke about 
having COVID-19. Yet our friends’ lighthearted tease was highly illustrative of the general 
sentiment at the beginning of the outbreak. They took for granted that details of the virus had been 
censored and that the situation was likely to be worse than what was reported at the time. But they 
calculated that the worst-case scenario would be an epidemic such as SARS, which China has 
proven its capacity to handle.  
It is difficult to say if our friends miscalculated the extent of the censorship, or if the Chinese 
government miscalculated the extent of the new epidemic. Most likely both. For the reality was 
quickly lost under the close surveillance of domestic reporting of the virus. After returning home in 
January, we started saving Chinese news reports and commentaries on the virus through clusters of 
screenshots. This was a better method than saving web links as “disharmonious” web content 
relating to the virus would be soon deleted without a trace. Due to the eight hour time difference 
between China and the UK, it was not uncommon for us to wake up in the morning, only to find 
that half of the articles passed on by friends had already been removed or their access denied. One 
study subsequently found that in February 2020 WeChat alone had added 516 new keyword 
combinations associated with the virus to their ban in the first 15 days of the month. This is on top 
of 132 keywords banned across the month of January and hundreds more from late December when 
the news first broke (Ruan et al 2020). These acts of deletion depend on massive, rapid data-
gathering and processing; they are a daily feature of living within Beijing’s surveillant assemblage. 
While countering misinformation related to the virus may have helped to keep public fear in check, 
restricting general discussions and factual information can have the opposite effect by limiting 
public awareness and response (Ruan et al 2020).  
More importantly, COVID-19 exposed how censorship works when it is “constitutionalised” in the 
political system. By constitutionalised we do not refer to the Chinese constitution as its protection 
of free speech in Article 35 is clearly overridden by legislation which allows for censorship on any 
number of grounds, including spreading rumours or disrupting social order and stability. Rather we 
refer to how censorship as a layered practice is constitutive in governing rationales far beyond 
central coordination, conditioning social actors thoughts and behaviours. Censorship as a 
normalised practice operates at the discretion of multiple authorities and can be discriminately 
applied in accordance to local needs (Wright 2014). 
For example, the level of censorship on COVID-19 was not evenly applied across different media 
in China. In the early phase of the outbreak, Wuhan’s local media was subject to more stringent 
censorship than elsewhere because of concerns over local stability.  According to a corpus study of 
Chinese official newspapers, between January 1 and January 20, 2020, coronavirus was only 
reported four times by the leading local newspaper Chutian Dushi Bao. Of these stories, two 
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rebuked “rumours” and two were official news releases by the local health bureau (Qian 2020). On 
20 January, before President Xi Jinping publicly acknowledged the seriousness of the outbreak and 
three days before the Wuhan lockdown, local news was still celebrating that in the lead up to the 
Spring Festival holiday, 20,000 free tickets to key tourist sites been handed out to the public. Such 
reportage led to a seemingly paradoxical level of public awareness of the pandemic. Towards the 
end of January, when most major cities around China were growing anxious about the virus, Wuhan 
residents were generally still relaxed. This was captured by a Chinese doggerel widely circulated on 
WeChat, China’s leading social media app, just days preceding the lockdown: “People in Hankou 
(the district where COVID-19 was first found) are happily doing their Spring Festival shopping, 
rushing to dinners and parties…The whole world knows that Wuhan is cordoned off, only Wuhan 
doesn’t know it yet.” In fact, a Beijing newspaper rather than one from Wuhan, first questioned 
Wuhan authorities’ insistence on “social harmony” at the cost of public ignorance. With the 
headline, “Wuhan’s calmness makes it impossible for the rest to remain calm”, the article compared 
the authorities’ attempts of harmonising a virus into political compliance to the absurdity of 
“running naked” amid dangers (She 2020). 
The contrast between media in Wuhan and Beijing was illuminating. Far from taking a simple 
uniform stand on ‘blacking out’ all news on the new virus or at least adopting a coordinated tone, 
regional media within China seemed to exhibit some flexibility in drawing their own lines in 
reporting the pandemic. This is in line with what many political scientists have termed ‘fragmented 
authoritarianism’ in Chinese politics (Saich 2010). That is, policy made at the centre becomes 
increasingly malleable as it trickles down since each level of government has its own set of 
concerns which may or may not match Beijing’s. This helps illustrate why surveillance measures – 
including censorship – can never totalize so long as discretion and context impinge on policy 
directives. In the case of COVID-19, while the media dare not point a finger at the central 
government, different local authorities had different priorities and understandings of transparency. 
For Beijing and other major cities in China, this meant warning their publics about the emerging 
public health threat whereas Wuhan media was subject to much tighter control, for exposing an 
epidemic in the city (i.e. at home) had more of an immediate impact on social stability. On one 
hand, censorship was at large in the sense that all Chinese media imposed some general constraints 
in framing and investigating the virus; on the other hand censorship was also at large in the sense 
that it was extraordinarily difficult to capture given how it was discretionarily imposed depending 
on the level of local tolerance. This meant, in effect, that fragments of facts were unevenly 
distributed across domestic media.  
We may never know how many citizens in Wuhan felt that they were misled into “running naked” 
when they went about with their daily routines before the lockdown. In fact, we may never know 
the “real” number of COVID-related death or confirmed cases in China. According to an 
investigatory report by China Youth Daily, in early January, following Wuhan’s local Health 
Commission’s guidance, at least some key hospitals in Wuhan had drafted their internal reporting 
standards to effectively exclude most of the COVID-19 cases (Yang 2020). Doctors who “report[ed] 
too many” cases were “scolded” by the head of the hospital (Yang 2020). In other words, from an 
individual doctor’s perspective, the surveillance of COVID cases was not so much about 
methodically removing or editing the facts, but more about reporting a “construct” that was within 
an acceptable range set by their immediate superiors. But what a “good” number of cases was 
depended on hospital directives and managers’ discretion. It then came as no surprise that Xi 
Jinping’s public recognition of the epidemic in the evening of 20 January was followed by a U-turn 
in Wuhan authority’s framing of the disease and a sharp rise in reported COVID cases (An 2020; 
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Xinhua News Press 2020). As Xi’s acknowledgment widened the space for COVID’s “social” 
existence, more cases could be admitted into official statistics. 
Discussion of how the Chinese government fabricates data is not new but it implies that the 
authorities actually know what the real numbers are. However, when censorship is at large, facts 
quickly become artefacts. That is to say, passing through multiple layers of censorship and self-
censorship, what is real (such as the number of COVID infection and death tolls) gives away to 
what is acceptable. But it is impossible to know when censorship began or ended in various sites, to 
what extent institutions and individuals censored their numbers, or how they judged whether they 
were being “harmonious” enough or not. Thus, it is not only a matter of controlling the narrative. A 
sinister side of censorship is that it may be an irreversible process – unlike under-reporting of 
COVID statistics that many other countries have struggled with due to time lags or problems in data 
collection (for example, on care home deaths), the truths that were blocked by censorship may not 
be retrievable. Given the overwhelming political pressure to censor the outbreak so as to maintain 
social harmony, it is very likely that no one in China has a full picture of the pandemic, including 
the authorities. Instead both the people and the government were coaxed into a harmonious 
blindness. We further explore how censorship is transmuted into such a state and how it constraints 
collective action in the next section.  
‘Harmoniously Denied’: The Latent Effects of Censorship 
Our discussion of propaganda helps illustrate how the constitutive and productive aspect of 
censorship are reflected not only in resistance but in the censoring process itself. Censorship 
constrains actions while diverting attention and energy to wherever government needs. Its impact 
extends beyond the point of censoring to the way we organise our thoughts and behaviours. By first 
examining a lack of initiative to confront the societal consequences of the lockdown, we 
demonstrate how censorship has not only harmoniously silenced public discussions. It has also 
created an unwitting collective “blindness” to certain social values, which in turn deters social 
mobilisation. Of course, we are not arguing that censorship is the only constraint on social 
imagination but the pursuit of “harmony” has played a significant role in shaping and rewarding 
some patterns of thoughts over others. More importantly, we draw attention to the fact that, in a 
global age, the effects of censorship cannot be viewed within the confines of a single nation-state. 
Using China’s latest censorship on COVID-19 research as an example, we argue that surveillance 
has also risked a negative impact on scientific progress. In other words, to fully comprehend the 
latent effects of censorship is important, for censorship is no longer a domestic power struggle but 
may also have global consequences. 
A key concern for all states was how they mitigated the various knock-on effects of lockdown. For 
example, following the UK’s lockdown in late March 2020, discussion on the welfare of different 
social groups filled mainstream news outlets: the impact of children with special needs, individuals 
in care homes, domestic violence, mental health and safety-nets for the self-employed. While this 
remains an ongoing challenge for all countries impacted by the pandemic, the public expression of 
concern brought attention to many underlying social issues from the start (UN 2020). As China 
ranks 76/176 (just behind Zimbabwe and just ahead of Ghana) according to Women Peace and 
Security Index, similar public concerns existed in China (Georgetown 2020). Yet very few (pre-
emptive) discussions on the social consequences of lockdown could be found in Chinese media or 
in academic debates.  If one types in “domestic violence” (jiabao or jiatingbaoli) and ‘coronavirus 
pneumonia’ (xinguanfeiyan), the common way for Chinese media to refer to COVID-19, into 
China’s search engine Baidu, the results are predominately news reports on the increase of domestic 
violence in other countries. Reports of domestic violence in China in the context of the pandemic 
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are scarce. Of course, Baidu, as the main Chinese search engine, has long been criticised for 
manipulating research results, bowing to political and commercial pressure. Thus we recognise that 
these findings might not be a full representation of what has been discussed or done about domestic 
violence in China during the lockdown. But this further underlines our point. That is, China’s 
surveillance state censors social controversies out of sight and thus out of mind. To add to this, in 
September 2020 we conducted the same keyword search via two large Chinese databases (Wanfang 
and CNKI) which include academic and quasi-academic publications. We found only two articles 
on domestic violence and COVID-19 in China. Both pieces were focused on what current legal 
provisions rather than engaging with actual data or cases. Naturally we do not assume that the 
media in liberal states necessarily have a fairer portrayal of these social issues; our point is that 
discussion in China is effectively non-existent.  
Academic literature on the lockdown further illustrate why censorship needs to be understood 
alongside efforts to shape the positive content of what people believe and think. Through a keyword 
search of the China Wanfang Database, conducted on April 29, 2020, we found 24 empirical studies 
on the public and medical professions’ response to the pandemic. While these studies – themselves 
a form of surveillance (Marx 2018) – pointed out a number of areas of public concern, all of them 
saw their participants’ worries not as something that social scientists should try to understand, but 
as a problem or a form of disharmony that needed to be corrected with further propaganda (e.g. 
PSHP 2020; Ye 2020; Dang 2020). For example, the Air Force Medical University conducted a 
comprehensive national survey of public reactions to the pandemic. Nearly 37,000 people were 
recruited online from 34 provincial jurisdictions (Fang, Peng et al 2020). The study found that 63% 
of those surveyed suffered from various degrees of anxiety, yet no effort was made to understand 
the source of their anxieties or how they differed across different social groups. Instead, the article 
concluded with a simple prescription that “timely publication of reliable and transparent 
information, enhancing the steering and propaganda role of the media” are needed (Fang, Peng et al 
2020). Similar results can found in a study carried out by the Psychological Society of Henan 
province. Among the 16,604 individuals surveyed, 31.2% expressed the preference to “leave 
infected areas and move to safer places.” Yet this was categorised as “irrational” (feilixing) by the 
article (PSHP 2020: 4). In response, the study suggested a threefold solution: “popularisation of 
pandemic knowledge”, “reliable provision of living necessities” and “enhanced media propaganda 
on government contingency plans” (PSHP 2020: 6) In other words, the paper called for thought 
control as the “cure” for people’s worries. 
Is the deafening silence on behalf of media and academic on thorny social issues a result of 
censorship or a result of propaganda? Perhaps both. It may even be difficult for the authors 
themselves to differentiate where they suppressed their views and where they advocated the party-
line. The insidious effect of censorship is that it not only eliminates facts; it denies the values 
underlying them, thus purposefully managing thought processes and plans of actions. Censorship 
thus coaxes individuals into silent acceptance of government directives. To demonstrate the latent 
effects of censorship, we resort to Goffman’s microsociology and analyse one of our own online 
COVID discussions (Goffman 1971). 
Despite published data showing that two-thirds of the medical staff volunteering to join the 
frontline were female (Lin 2020), in the early stages of COVID-19, images on posters paying 
tribute to the medical profession were predominantly male. This was especially the case for posters 
adopted by key institutions and thus widely circulated, such as the ones used by China’s Central 
Television (Figure 1) and China’s Community Youth League (Figure 2). Even later when medical 
staff were heralded as “the most beautiful countermarching people” (zuimei nixingzhe – 
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countermarching in the sense that ordinary wisdom would be to stay away rather than heading 
towards worst hit areas), male images dominated commercial posters and news reports (Figure 3, 
also see People’s Daily report on this topic by Ye 2020). We wrote a post in early February on 
Chinese social media questioning this skewed representation of gender. The response was mixed. 
While some commented that this was an “interesting point”, others disapproved of our “making a 
fuss”. One such criticism came from Author A’s own cousin, who, along with his wife, were 
frontline doctors. He argued that everyone was, or should be, preoccupied with fighting the virus 
rather than commenting on social issues. Why should we “distract” concentration with “the trivial 
matter of gender equality”? Our point here is not about the state of gender equality in China which 
is surely a complex issue. Moreover, we use this anecdote “to illustrate rather than to prove 
generalization” (Verhoeven 1985: 89) as one could easily write this example off as the chauvinistic 
opinion of one man. What we want to highlight here are two points related to the thought processes 
of Author A’s cousin. First, his rationale perfectly echoes China’s development strategy over the last 
40 years. That is, China has been exceptionally good at identifying one goal (fighting the 
coronavirus, staging the Olympics) and concentrating the whole nation into achieving that goal 
through a rapid reallocation of financial and human resources. Wider social discussions are 
considered a distraction when a “consensus crisis” is needed to mobilise resources to alleviate 
public suffering (Xu 2017). There is a pragmatic argument for closing down discussion altogether: 
even if issues were raised, given limited government resources and underdeveloped social services, 
China still lacks the capacity to address many of its social ills. Secondly, Author A’s cousin provides 
a good example of peer monitoring (Andrejevic 2005, 2006).  In effect his comments are an attempt 
to shoulder responsibility in a kind of DIY monitoring practice that reinforce and replicate the 
imperatives of security and productivity. Such forms of self-surveillance and control have not 
appeared overnight. They are instead dependent on habits of complicity, or at least of acquiescence, 
that have been a very long time in forming (Reeves 2017).  
Figure 1. COVID poster with the theme that frontline medical staff are the  “great heroes” of our 
times. Logo on the lower third of the image shows this is an image used by CCTV news.  
 
     
Figure 2. COVID poster with the caption ‘Please Return Safely’. Upper 
right corner shows this is an image used by the Central Committee of 
China’s Communist Youth League. 
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Figure 3. An example of commercial COVID-19 poster paying tribute to 
medical staff who head into the centre of the pandemic as the “most 
beautiful countermarching people” in the fight against the virus. 
 
Yet how can a civil society grow if the social issues it is to address are not 
allowed to be made visible or to be articulated in public in the first place? 
Among the COVID-19 tragedies that made world news from China were a 
17-year-old boy with cerebral palsy who died at home when he was left 
without a carer after his relatives were put under quarantine and a 6-year-old boy who was locked in 
with his deceased grandfather for several days due to a gap in community support (Standaert 2020; 
Kuo 2020b). If the disabled were no longer living as the “invisible millions” in China (Campbell 
and Uren 2011), and if civil society were free to examine and critique the shortfall of support to 
left-behind children and the elderly, could things have resulted differently? Some years ago we 
expressed our optimism about Chinese civil society and specifically about how environmental 
groups were gaining a sense of autonomy within the system (Zhang and Barr 2013). We would be 
unable to write that book today given the extent to which controls have tightened within China. 
When a society gets used to a norm in which certain facts must not be true and certain discussions 
should not be permitted, silence may turn into indifference. The true gravity of censorship lies not 
in what has been removed or blocked by China’s sophisticated online filtering system, but in how 
many ordinary Chinese citizens didn’t even have the chance to self-censor, for some of the social 
challenges were considered as “non-issues” in the first place, hidden behind a false sense of 
pragmatism.  
As censorship shrinks social recognition of which community interests requires respect and which 
values are worth protecting, it precludes a society’s potential through a “harmonious denial” of 
community needs. This echoes Arendt (1974) who in an interview late in her life, noted, “What 
makes it possible for a totalitarian or any other dictatorship to rule is that people are not informed; 
how can you have an opinion if you are not informed? … [The public] is deprived not only of its 
capacity to act but also of its capacity to think and to judge.” It then becomes reliant on 
technocratic, authoritarian leaders to identify and sanction social action on issues. Censorship 
distorts perception of what is within a person’s responsibility (e.g. collective deliberation on 
nequality, or mental health) as beyond their means and out of reach. Here, censorship re-
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terriotorises the space for our socio-political imagination in which certain thoughts and actions 
became literally unthinkable (Galison 2012).  
In relation to this, one highly important but often ignored point is that the impact of a country’s 
censorship does not end at its borders. Censoring collective thought not only limits how Chinese 
society views their future options; it weakens global efforts in finding solutions to common 
problems. One example is that amid the ongoing blame game between the US and China on who 
was responsible for the virus, China’s Ministry of Education (MOE) issued a new Directive,  
imposing political oversight which ensures scientific projects are in harmony with government 
narratives (Gan, Hu and Watson 2020). After CNN’s exposed the Directive, its content was 
removed from the Chinese website, although through our contacts, we know the actual scrutiny is 
still ongoing and applies to both social and natural science publications (Kirchgaessner et al 2020). 
While the full content of this 350-word Directive can be found on web archive link on the CNN 
report (see Gan, Hu and Watson 2020), the gist of its three items can be summarised as follows:  
• All papers relating to the origin of the virus need to be filed and reported to the office of the 
Ministry of Education. Ministerial approval is needed before any submission to academic 
journals. 
• For all other COVID related research, submission to academic journals, including choice of 
domestic or foreign journals, requires prior agreement from university academic 
committees. This deliberation process needs to be recorded and filed according to MOE 
standards. 
• Research topics that fall under biosecurity regulations or the human genetic resource 
regulation should be closely monitored. Clinical and vaccine research should be published 
with due diligence. 
The political intention of this Directive is quite clear from the start: contrary to Xi Jinping’s original 
call for “expediting the search for the origin of virus” on 20 January (Xinhua News Press 2020), the 
first item of the Directive sends a strong signal discouraging the scientific community from 
conducting origin research. It transfers scientific speech-rights (i.e. when and where to publish) 
from the authors to the Ministry. For COVID-19 researchers, sharing lab findings is no longer a 
scientific activity, but has been incorporated into a collective and coordinated political act that 
requires ministerial level oversight. Yet the social relations within this newly founded censorship 
scheme are not linear. By requesting institutional filing, the scientific community has been 
harmonised into China’s surveillant assemblage. In this way, the scientific community is both the 
censor and the censored.  
Moreover, we highlight that the impact is not just national, but global. At a time when global 
research collaboration is needed most, China, which accounts for 36% of the world’s scientific 
papers in the life sciences, and has a large volume of data on COVID-19, such surveillance risks the 
global exchange of critical data (Apuzzo and Kirkpatrick 2020; Canales and McNaughton 2019). 
Previous studies on China’s life scientific communities have highlighted how the over-politicisation 
of science has impeded scientific development by suppressing politically sensitive research (Zhang 
2015, 2012). In a widely circulated article published by Scientia Sinica Vitae, a prestigious journal 
sponsored by the Chinese Academy of Science and China’s Natural Science Foundation, Chinese 
researchers’ expressed their concerns, “Although Chinese scientists have won international approval 
by publicising the genetic data of the virus, the speed of data-sharing from Chinese researchers 
became much slower than international peers when it came to later data analysis. Yet such sharing is 
critical to the global collaborative combat on the risk of virus mutations” (Lei et al 2020). When 
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censorship threatens to impact scientists’ decisions on what types of questions to ask, when to ask 
them, and what to avoid, the resulting scientific compliance may be at the cost of a lost realm of 
knowledge, impeding global prospects.  
Censorship surveils the expressed and by extension, regulates the not-yet-expressed. It surveils 
what can be perceived, and by extension, pre-conditions the not-yet-conceived. In the case of 
China, censorship has bent society into a harmonious acquiescence, a shrunken social-political 
imagination. COVID-19 makes visible the hidden cost of curtailing the means and promise in our 
individual and collective search of a good life, within and beyond nation-state borders. 
Conclusion 
The daily acts of resistance against China’s surveillance regime are well documented in the 
literature cited earlier and are evident in the response to Li Wenliang’s death. Censorship may be an 
act of “dis-appearance, which combines algorithm and human censors to make invisible what 
cannot be said” but it is also a way of “producing speech” (Yang 2016: 1370; Butler 1997: 128, 
emphasis original). The outpouring of grief over Li’s death quickly turned into demands for 
freedom of speech, but those posts were swiftly censored. The trending topics “#we want freedom 
of speech” had nearly two million views before being deleted. The phrase “#Wuhan government 
owes Dr Li Wenliang an apology” also attracted tens of thousands of views before it too 
disappeared. Beyond the anger, lie deeper criticisms. In April 2020 Qinghua professor Xu Zhangrun 
published a scathing critique of the party-state which captures our argument well. 
Censorship increases by the day, and the effect of this is to weaken or obliterate those 
very things that can and should play a positive role in alerting society to critical issues 
[of public concern]. In response to the coronavirus, for instance, at first the authorities 
shut down all hints of public disquiet and outspoken commentary via censorship. It 
takes no particular leap of the imagination to appreciate that along with such acts of 
crude expediency a soulless pragmatism can make even greater political inroads (Xu 
2020: 11). 
But the scope and scale of China’s censorship regime severely limits the ability of its citizens to 
counter-conduct, that is to exercise “the will not to be governed thusly, like that, by these people, at 
this price” (Foucault 1997: 72). Xu, like so many others who spoke out, is now reportedly under 
house arrest (Yu and Graham-Harrison 2020). Thus, the impact of government censorship would be 
hugely understated (if not misunderstood) if one only sees its damage in terms of political 
transparency. In so doing one misses how China, or other societies with similar censorship 
practices, could enhance preparedness for the next critical event.  
We have demonstrated an overlooked aspect of censorship studies: that of its long-term effects on a 
society’s ability to imagine otherwise. As a form of surveillance, we proposed the notion of 
censorship at large to extend discussion on its ubiquitous nature. When censorship is discretionarily 
applied at multiple levels by various actors, facts become lost to both the censor and censored. 
Censorship’s impact is also at large in the sense that it is not limited to one country but may also 
restrict global progress. Yet we see the most deleterious effects of censorship in the way it places an 
artificial restriction on social potential. The response and lack of response to COVID-19 in China 
sheds light on the latent effects of censorship. Apart from a denying reality in the name of harmony, 
we demonstrated how collective values – or we may say, how “China’s dreams” – were blackened 
out from the collective mentality as different branches of society are harmonised into a surveillant 
assemblages, blurring the boundaries between censor and censored. Seen in this way, the pursuit of 
a harmonious society has paradoxically led to the harmonious denial of many of the social values 
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which could strengthen Chinese civil society. Unfortunately this is not a new phenomenon. Over 
forty years ago Václav Havel warned about systems which were captive to its own lies. Havel 
believed that “individuals need not believe all these mystifications, but they must behave as if they 
did, or they must at least tolerate them in silence.” (Havel 1978). 
As King and colleagues (2013; see also Shao 2018) have shown, censorship is not primarily aimed 
at comments critical of China’s  party-state. Rather, censorship targets collective action by silencing 
comments that represent, reinforce, or spur social mobilization. If this is the case it underpins our 
claims that some of the more profound damage of censorship lies not so much in what has been 
altered or removed, but what has been denied of existence in the first place: facts not 
acknowledged, risks not calculated, problems not discussed, questions not asked. That is to say, if 
collective action is killed off at its roots then it is little wonder why society is unable to mobilise 
itself to address pressing social issues – disability rights, gender equality, mental health to name but 
a few. Or to put it another way, the party-state seems to be “breeding its population to select against 
the trait of critical, independent thinking” – a move that may benefit it in the short term but comes 
with a significant cost (Mitchell and Diamond 2020).  
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